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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mark Lee Ellis appeals from his conviction for two counts of possession of 
sexually exploitative material. Specifically, Ellis challenges the denial of his 
suppression motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The relevant facts as found by the district court in its decision and order 
denying Ellis' motion to suppress are as follows: 
The defendant was arrested on an agent's warrant for a 
parole violation on March 17, 2010. A Parole Commission warrant 
was issued on March 25, 2010 for the arrest of the defendant. He 
was arrested on the Parole Commission warrant on March 26, 
2012. After his arrest, the defendant's parole officer was contacted 
by a neighbor who said that she had been asked by the defendant 
to go into his apartment and take his methamphetamine pipe, some 
drugs, DVDs, and cell phones from a "secret" compartment or 
room. On March 30, 2010, as a result of the neighbor's call, the 
parole officer went to the defendant's apartment and contacted the 
defendant's landlord. The parole officer mentioned that the 
defendant had talked about a "secret room" near the kitchen and 
the landlord explained that the "secret room" was a maintenance 
area on the porch outside of the defendant's apartment which only 
the landlord and his maintenance worker were supposed to use 
and access. The landlord then went to the area and opened it up. 
The area was closed and then the parole officers and the landlord 
entered the defendant's apartment and accessed the "secret room" 
from the defendant's apartment. The parole officer recovered 
paraphernalia, controlled substances, CDSs/DVDs [sic], and cell 
phones and booked them into evidence. The DVDs were examined 
by a detective who found file names consistent with child 
pornography, Based upon a review of the file names, a search 
warrant was sought to permit a more extensive forensic analysis of 
the multiple telephones seized and the CDs/DVDs. On July 27, 
2010, the Parole Commission entered formal findings that the 
defendant had violated his parole and recommended that his parole 
be revoked. 
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(R., pp.193-194.) 
The state charged Ellis with ten separate counts of possession of sexually 
exploitative material with a sentencing enhancement for being a persistent 
violator. (R., pp.152-155, 165-166.) Ellis filed a motion to suppress and two 
amended motions to suppress asserting the warrantless search violated his 
rights. (R., pp.31-36, 41-46, 104-109.) At a hearing on the motion, the parties 
offered no testimony, instead submitting the issues on their briefing. (Tr., pp.6-
9.) The district court took the matter under advisement, ultimately denying the 
motion to suppress in a written order: 
In conclusion, the defendant lacked any reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the storage area/"secret room" because it 
was a maintenance area that he was not actually authorized to use. 
Even if he were authorized to use it and had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, the landlord also had full access to the area 
and the right to consent to its search. Moreover, the fact that he 
was trying, from custody, to arrange for the destruction of evidence 
created an exigency that justified an immediate search to prevent 
the removal and destruction of evidence. Finally, although this is a 
question of first impression in Idaho, the mere fact that the 
defendant was in custody did not invalidate his prior valid Fourth 
Amendment waiver which he gave as a condition of receiving 
parole. For all of these reasons, the motion to suppress is denied. 
(R., p.200.) 
Ellis entered a conditional guilty plea to two counts of possession of 
sexually exploitative material, the state dismissed the remaining eight charges 
and withdrew the persistent violator sentencing enhancement, and with agreed to 
recommend a sentence of five years fixed followed by five years indeterminate 
on one count and a 5 year indeterminate sentence to be served consecutively on 
the remaining charge. (R., p.202, 205-211; Tr., 19, L.9 - p.30, L.22.) 
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The district court sentenced Ellis to five years fixed followed by five years 
indeterminate on Count II and five years indeterminate on Count IV to be served 
consecutively. (R., pp.218-221; Tr., p.47, L.7 - p.51, L.4.) Ellis timely appeals. 
(R., pp.225-229.) 
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ISSUE 
Ellis states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ellis' motion to suppress? 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Ellis failed to show that the district court erred in denying his suppression 
motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
Ellis Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Ellis' motion to suppress on four grounds. First, it 
found Ellis lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the maintenance room 
searched. (R., p.200.) Second, it found the landlord validly consented to the 
search of the maintenance room. (Id.) Third, it concluded Ellis' attempt to have 
a neighbor remove incriminating· evidence of criminal conduct from the 
maintenance room created an exigency allowing a search to be conducted 
without a warrant. (Id.) Finally, the district court held Ellis' arrest on a suspected 
parole violation did not suspend his valid Fourth Amendment waiver entered as a 
condition of parole. (Id.) 
Ellis argues "he has standing to challenge the State's entrance into his 
apartment and its subsequent discovery of contraband based on a trespass 
theory." (Appellant's brief, p.6-12.) Ellis further asserts that the district court 
erred in finding there was a valid Fourth Amendment waiver in effect at the time 
of the search or that there were circumstances present that justified the finding of 
third party consent or exigent circumstances. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-29.) Ellis' 
claims fail. A review of the record, in light of the applicable legal standards, 
supports the district court's conclusion that the search of the maintenance room 
adjoining Ellis' apartment was justified. 
As such, the district court did not err when it denied Ellis' motion to 
suppress. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts." State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). The power to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw 
factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 
102, 106, 897 P .2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 
P .2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court also gives deference to any 
implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence. State v. 
Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999). 
C. Ellis Has Failed To Establish A Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy In The 
Maintenance Room 
The Fourth Amendment protects against governmental intrusion upon an 
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
170, 177 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). Thus, as a 
threshold matter, "one who challenges the legality of a search must establish that 
he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the thing searched." State v. 
Harwood, 133 Idaho 50, 52, 981 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing 
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980)). Here, the thing searched was 
"a maintenance area on the porch outside of the defendant's apartment which 
only the landlord and his maintenance worker were supposed to use and 
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access." (R., p.194.) Ellis has failed to establish he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in that maintenance room. 
Ellis asserts: 
[he] need not prove he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the storage area in order to establish standing because Officer 
Kiehl's decision to trespass into Mr. Ellis' apartment created the 
standing necessary for Mr. Ellis to challenge the legality of the 
search of his apartment on the basis of the Fourth Amendment. 
(Appellant's brief, p.12.) Ellis supports his position with the United State's 
Supreme Court's decision in US v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (Jan. 23, 2012). In 
Jones, the Court stated that "when the Government does engage in physical 
intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that 
intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Jones 132 S.Ct. 
at 951 (quoting U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (concurring opinion)). 
The Court held that installation of a GPS tracking device on a vehicle constituted 
a search requiring a warrant. ~ Contrary to Ellis' position, however, not all 
trespasses will result in a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Jones, 132 
S.Ct. at 953 ("an intrusion on an 'open field' did not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment search even though it was a trespass at common law" (citation 
omitted). 
The only issue in Jones was whether GPS tracking constituted a "search." 
The Court found "the Government physically occupied private property for the 
purpose of obtaining information." Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 949. Here, there is no 
doubt there was a search of the maintenance room. Ellis must still show that he 
had a valid privacy interest in the place searched. Ellis has not established he 
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had a reasonable expectation of privacy in this maintenance room. Nor has he 
shown any "trespass" occurred. Finally, he has failed to show that even if there 
was a trespass it rose to the level of being a Fourth Amendment violation. 
The entry into Ellis' apartment was not a search of his apartment, nor did 
the utilization of his apartment as an access to the maintenance room eliminate 
the need of Ellis to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in such room in 
order to contest the search. The maintenance room was accessed by the 
landlord 'from the porch outside Ellis' apartment, where the landlord noticed that 
"items near the door that would open into Mark Eiiis's apartment had been 
moved." (R., p.67 (Defendant's Ex. 3).) Upon making this observation, the 
landlord locked up the room, retrieved screwdrivers, and went in through Ellis' 
apartment where he used a screwdriver to open the door because it did not have 
a door handle allowing ready access from Ellis' apartment. (R., pp.67-68 
(Defendant's Ex. 3).) Thus, the record indicates that the need to access the 
maintenance room through the apartment was created by Ellis, who trespassed 
into the room and moved items. More importantly, the parole officer did not 
acquire information by trespass because he only gained access to a place he 
had permission to be and Eiiis's consent to parole searches means he was not a 
trespasser in the apartment. 
D. Ellis Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Motion To Suppress 
Ellis has also failed to show any entry or search was not justified by his 
Fourth Amendment waiver as a condition of parole. Ellis argues the search of 
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the maintenance room was not a valid parole search because the state did not 
introduce the original Fourth Amendment waiver into the record at the 
suppression hearing 1 and the Fourth Amendment waiver was not in effect at the 
time of the search because of Ellis' arrest and subsequent incarceration. (R., 
pp.12-23.) The district court correctly held the "issuance of a warrant is not the 
equivalent of the revocation of a parole," thereby not acting to suspend the 
conditions of parole including the waiver of Fourth Amendment rights. (R., 
pp.196-198.) 
Below and on appeal Ellis relies on language in Idaho Code § 20-228 for 
his position that his Fourth Amendment waiver was no longer in effect once a 
warrant was issued alleging a violation of his parole. (Appellant's brief, pp.23.) 
The statute reads as follows: 
The commission for pardons and parole, in releasing a 
person on parole, shall specify in writing the conditions of parole, 
and a copy of such conditions shall be given to the person paroled. 
Whenever the commission finds that a parolee may have violated 
the conditions of parole, the written order of the commission, signed 
by a member or members of the commission or the executive 
director, shall be sufficient warrant for any law enforcement officer 
to take into custody such person, and it is hereby made the duty of 
all sheriffs, police, constables, parole and probation officers, prison 
officials and other peace officers, to execute such order. Such 
warrant shall serve to suspend the person's parole until a 
determination on the merits of the allegations of the violation has 
been made pursuant to a revocation hearing. From and after the 
issuance of the warrant and suspension of the parole of any 
convicted person and until arrest, the parolee shall be considered a 
fugitive from justice. Such person so recommitted must serve out 
the sentence, and the time during which such prisoner was out on 
1 The district court noted in denying Ellis' motion to suppress that "[t]here [was] no 
question, that when [Ellis] was granted parole, he was subject to a valid 
requirement that he submit to warrantless searches" (R., p.198) as well as the 
fact that Ellis had "not challenged the validity of the waiver" (R., p.196). 
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parole shall not be deemed a part thereof; unless the commission, 
in its discretion, shall determine otherwise, but nothing herein 
contained shall prevent the commission from again paroling such 
prisoners at its discretion. 
LC. § 20-228. 
Ellis' reliance on State v. Fuller, 138 Idaho 60, 57 P .3d 771 (2002), for the 
position that issuance of a parole violation warrant rendered his previously valid 
Fourth Amendment waiver void (Appellant's brief, pp.15-20) is misplaced as this 
Court determined l.C. § 20-228 did not control the "resolution of the motions to 
suppress" in Fuller's case. Fuller, 138 Idaho at 63, 57 P.3d at 774. Ellis was still 
on parole for his conviction. As the district court noted: "[t]he issuance of a 
warrant is not the equivalent of the revocation of parole. Parole cannot be 
revoked until there is a due process hearing." (R., p.197.) Although arrested on 
an allegation that he had violated the terms and conditions of his parole, Ellis 
was still entitled to a hearing to determine if he had in fact violated his parole. 
Only then could his parole be revoked. Mattoon v. Blades, 145 Idaho 634, 181 
P.3d 1242 (2008) (abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011 )). See Morrissey 
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (state must provide due process prior to 
revocation of parole); also People v. Ely, 76 Cal.App.3d 1006, 143 Cal.Rptr. 
344 (1978) (parole consent to search still effective after parole suspended from 
commitment for substance abuse treatment); People v. DuBose, 17 Cal.App.3d 
43, 48, 94 Cal.Rptr. 376, 379 (Cal.App. 1971) (at the time of arrest, defendant's 
legal status was that of parolee whose parole was subject to revocation for 
cause, and also that of escapee and fugitive from justice; this status continued 
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pending ultimate disposition of the charges of parole violation). Because Ellis 
remained a parolee until the final disposition of the allegations of parole violation, 
he was still under obligation to conform his conduct to the terms of parole -
including terms such as not engaging in criminal conduct and submitting to 
searches. Suspension of parole served only to suspend his limited physical 
freedom pending resolution of the parole violation charges. 
Ellis asserts his parole was "suspended" by his arrest on the Parole 
Commission's warrant prohibiting a warrantless search for evidence of previous 
violations of his parole. Ellis describes the situation in terms of a contract: 
Since parole is technically revoked it logically follows that the parole 
agreement is either suspended or terminated and, therefore 
unenforceable. Another way to think about it is through contract 
law. Once Mr. Ellis lost the benefit of the parole agreement, 
release from custody, the State can no longer enforce the 
agreement. 
(Appellant's brief, p.17.) Ellis' contract argument fails on two levels. First, parole 
cannot be "technically revoked" by the issuance of a warrant. A revocation can 
only be accomplished by a decision entered by the Parole Commission following 
a hearing. That had not yet happened when Ellis' parole officer went to his home 
to search the storage room attached to Ellis' apartment upon obtaining 
information that Ellis was attempting to destroy evidence of further violations. 
Additionally, the mere allegation of a violation does not relieve a parolee of the 
benefit of the agreements or his rights therein. Ellis still had the right to a hearing 
to determine if he had violated the terms prior to a revocation. 
Had Ellis no longer been subject to warrantless searches of a condition of 
his parole, the officer was still justified in searching for evidence of a parole 
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violation. Parolees and probationers enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy 
against governmental intrusion. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); 
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). Thus, a probationer is subject to 
warrantless searches by a probation officer if that probation officer has 
reasonable suspicion the probationer has violated probation. Knights, 534 U.S. 
at 121-22; State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 487-88, 95 P.3d 635, 638-39 
(2004) (defendant released on own recognizance after conviction but before 
sentencing is subject to search upon reasonable suspicion); State v. Adams, 146 
Idaho 162, 164, 191 P.3d 240, 242 (Ct. App. 2008) (probation searches based on 
suspicion are reasonable "[e]ven in the absence of a warrantless search 
condition"). 
In State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496-98, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242-44 
(2006), this Court upheld the search of a probationer based on reasonable 
suspicion even though there was no Fourth Amendment waiver applicable at the 
time of the search. In Turek, the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized that "well-
developed law in this area establishes that probation searches may be 
conducted without consent when the officers are there to investigate reasonable 
suspicion of violation of probation terms." State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 748, 
250 P.3d 796, 799 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Klingler and distinguishing State v. 
Pinson, 104 Idaho 227, 657 P.2d 1095 (Ct. App. 1983), in which a probation 
search based on reasonable suspicion was upheld where there was no consent 
to search as a condition of probation). 
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Here Ellis' parole officer had reasonable suspicion that Ellis was in 
violation of his parole because he was in possession of drug paraphernalia and 
controlled substances based on a call from Ellis' neighbor with information that 
Ellis wanted her to go into his apartment to remove incriminating evidence. (R., 
p.193.) Because the parole search was justified by reasonable suspicion it was 
constitutionally proper and as such, should be affirmed by this Court. See, ~. 
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999); State v. 
Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997) (where the lower court 
reaches the correct result by a different theory, the appellate court will affirm the 
order on the correct theory). 
Additionally, the information the parole officer had that Ellis was reaching 
out from custody to have incriminating evidence removed supports the district 
court's finding the search was "justified on the basis of exigent circumstances." 
(R., pp.195-195.) It is well settled that entries necessitated by "exigent 
circumstances" do not offend the warrant requirement. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 
U.S 499, 509 (1978); State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225, 869 P.2d 224, 225 
(1993); State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 432, 434, 925 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Ct. App. 
1996). "Under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, 
the need to prevent the destruction of evidence is justification for what would 
otherwise be illegal police conduct." State v. Hoak, 107 Idaho 742, 748, 692 
P.2d 1174, 1180 (1984); accord Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) 
(imminent risk of destruction of evidence is an exigency that justifies a 
warrantless search); State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 912, 136 P.3d 379, 383 
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(Ct. App. 2006) (same); State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 559, 716 P.2d 1328, 
1331 (Ct. App. 1986) (same). In order for the this exception to apply, the police 
must have probable cause to believe that evidence is present in the place to be 
searched and must also possess "a reasonable belief that unless they act, the 
evidence will be destroyed." Hoak, 107 Idaho at 748-49, 692 P.2d at 1180-81 
(footnote omitted); accord Rusho, 110 Idaho at 559, 716 P.2d at 1331 (citing 
Mincey, 437 U.S. 385) ("Probable cause and a compelling emergency, such as 
imminent destruction of evidence ... must be shown."). Applying these principles 
in this case, the district court correctly ruled that the officers were justified by 
exigent circumstances in accessing the maintenance room through Ellis' 
apartment to prevent the destruction of evidence. Because Ellis had "contacted 
his neighbor from the jail to get her to remove evidence," it was reasonable of the 
parole officer to "conclude that haste was essential." (R., p.196.) 
Finally, Ellis maintains any consent given by the landlord to search the 
maintenance room through Ellis' apartment was invalid because the landlord did 
not have the authority to consent to a search of his apartment itself. (Appellant's 
brief, p.25.) As discussed in Section "C" above, the access of the maintenance 
room, for which Ellis has failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
through Ellis' apartment was necessitated by Ellis' own actions of trespassing in 
the maintenance room and moving items which required entrance through his 
apartment. As the district court correctly concluded in finding valid consent by 
the landlord to search the maintenance room, "the landlord could consent to the 
search of the storage area because the landlord possessed common authority 
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over that area even if the defendant's access were legitimate." (R., p.195.) See 
State v. Misner, 135 Idaho 277, 279, 16 P.3d 953, 955 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(Permission for a warrantless search "need not come from the defendant; it may 
be obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other 
sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.") 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and 
district court's order denying Ellis' motion to suppress. 
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